ABA
Industry Resource Guide

Identification and Verification of Accountholders

January 2002
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AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION®
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Identification and Verification of Account Holders

Table of Contents

Introduction 1

Findings 2

ABA Account Opening Best Practices Group 2

Account Identification and Verification Processes 3

Appendix I 9
Suggested Process Flow

Appendix II 10
Additional Resources

Appendix III 12
ABA Account Opening Best Practices Group

Appendix IV 13
Account Opening Best Practices Meeting Participants
Introduction

On October 26, 2001, President Bush signed into law the USA Patriot Act of 2001. The Act, a broad anti-terrorism measure, contains a major section on money laundering (title III). The ABA strongly supported the legislation, and has pledged to work closely with all aspects of the financial services industry, as well as government and law enforcement officials, to implement the provisions of this important act in the fight against terrorism.

Section 326 of the Patriot Act requires the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regulations that will set forth standards for financial institutions to follow in the identification and verification of customers at account opening. The regulations will, at a minimum, require that all financial institutions:

- Verify the identity of any person seeking to open an account to the extent reasonable and practicable;
- Maintain records of the information used to verify a person’s identity, including name, address, and other identifying information; and
- Consult lists of known or suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations provided to the financial institution by any government agency to determine whether a person seeking to open an account appears on any such list.

The legislative intent of Section 326 of the Patriot Act was not to force wholesale changes in the manner in which financial institutions identify and verify accountholders, but rather to ensure that the industry will continue to have adequate policies and procedures and follow best practices. This approach by Congress and the Administration is based on the view that financial institutions by-and-large already have sufficient policies and procedures for account opening.

In fact, the industry has a long history of developing and implementing comprehensive account opening identification and verification procedures and devising best practices to assist in these efforts. As an example, the ABA Check Fraud Prevention Manual, which has already been distributed to over 1,500 financial institutions, outlines a number of ways by which financial institutions can verify the identification of accountholders. This and other available resources are noted in Appendix II of this reference guide.
ABA Account Opening Best Practices Group

The ABA Account Opening Best Practices Group was organized, while the legislation was still being drafted, to develop guidance and recommendations for financial institutions to use in the identification and verification of account holders at account opening. The guidance that has been developed should also provide valuable assistance to financial institutions to comply with the requirements of Section 326 of the USA Patriot Act.

The eight members of the Account Opening Best Practices Group represent a cross-section of ABA’s membership. During its deliberations, the Group held discussions with representatives from the securities industry and a variety of state and federal law enforcement and regulatory agencies, as well as with private sector experts.

In addition, the Account Opening Best Practices Group joined efforts with a similar initiative that was organized by the New York Clearing House in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11. The Resource Guide developed by this Group will be incorporated into the broader work of a Clearing House initiative and distributed to financial services organizations and government agencies.

Findings

During the Group’s discussions, it became clear that one of the challenges associated with the current process of identification and verification at account opening is the ease with which identification documents can be falsified. There are a number of vulnerabilities that currently exist in identifying customers, including:

- Lack of uniform procedures for official state identifications;
- Lack of governmental verification processes;
- Lack of meaningful biometric identifiers, and
- Lack of real-time commercial verification products.

These vulnerabilities contribute to a proliferation of Internet websites, where any driver’s license or other form of identification may be purchased, sometimes with a “novelty tag” attached to create the subterfuge that the identification document was not intended to be used in a fraudulent fashion. To the extent that many states do not have a mechanism to verify identifications, the Group finds that the current system is simply not sufficient to catch fraudulent state and federal identification documents.

Financial institutions, by-and-large, already have sufficient policies and procedures for account opening. The current account opening procedures at the vast majority of institutions have not been subject to supervisory criticism. The purpose of this, therefore, is to insure that information garnered during the account opening process was properly
authenticated, balanced with the need to make the process reasonable for the customer as well as the financial institution.

It is also important to emphasize that the material in this Resource Guide is purely intended to provide guidance to financial institutions. Each institution should look within its own operations/business markets and make appropriate determinations based upon their risk assessments in order to properly use this when adjusting or creating any new account opening practices.

Any regulations promulgated under this section should not proscribe specific account opening procedures. Different financial institutions should have the latitude to take different approaches depending on their unique characteristics. Giving each financial institution the flexibility to derive its own procedures also lessens the potential burden on community financial institutions.

The low-dollar volume and conventional nature of the accounts utilized by the terrorists, and the fact that many aspects of the terrorist’s financial behavior are still unknown, adds to the complexity of determining appropriate account opening process, and further dictates a flexible approach to regulation.

The vulnerabilities associated with the current system of identification are magnified when the potential customer is a foreign national. The many challenges associated with the visa and foreign passport identification systems render them unacceptable for authentication purposes. The vulnerability of these documents to fraud, as well as the ease with which they can be obtained legally, demonstrates that neither document should be able to stand on its own as a form of identification.

The Group strongly recommends that financial institution efforts to authenticate accountholders focus on the information contained within the identification document, not on attempting to determine the veracity of the identification document. Moreover, in terms of the veracity of the identification, it is imperative that financial institutions receive effective, timely and comprehensive governmental support to enhance the verification process and efforts to authenticate identification documents and information provided.

**Account Identification And Verification Processes**

Based on previous industry guidance and recent discussions with a wide range of industry, government and related experts, the American Bankers Association and the Account Opening Best Practices Group have devised the following set of options for financial institutions to consider in developing customer identification processes. These options take into account the diverse customer identification practices used throughout the financial services industry and are not intended to provide rigid requirements that may not address the specific products, customers or compliance risks that individual financial institutions may identify in connection with their businesses.
In providing these options, the Group recognizes that due to the widespread availability of false documentation, the lack of accessible identification data bases, the inability to verify identification documents with issuing government agencies, as well as other factors, even the most comprehensive customer identification and verification processes will not assure the identity of the person opening an account. Consequently, the verification processes provided below deal primarily with the accuracy of information provided by the customer in the identification process. Without additional verification tools that deal with the legitimacy of the identification document provided by a customer, assurances of actual customer identity in many cases would be difficult to confirm.

Financial institutions have substantial incentives for strong policies to verify account applicants' identification in order to prevent fraud losses. The following are suggested policies to address the identification challenge facing financial institutions. These policies align with the suggested account opening identification and verification process flow chart included as Appendix I:

**Individual Accounts**

The collection of various types of identifying information and documentation and the processes for verification, as suggested below, may not be applicable to every type of customer or account. Financial institutions may conclude that based on their risk assessment of the customer and the type of services being provided that some customers (e.g. non-resident aliens) or types of accounts (e.g. private bank accounts) may require more or less extensive identifying information and verification than others.

For new accounts at a financial institution opened by a natural person (or more than one natural person) including a sole proprietor business account, the institution should, at a minimum, obtain and record the following information about each owner of the account:

1. Name
2. Tax Identification Number
3. Address
4. Telephone Number
5. Occupation
6. Date of Birth
7. Information concerning business (if sole proprietor business account), such as
business address, telephone number and Tax Identification Number, if different
than the information of the individual.

As technology advances, institutions may also wish to evaluate and consider certain
“biometric” identification information, when practicable, (such as fingerprint or other
process that provides information unique to the person opening the account).

In addition, depending upon the nature of the relationship, additional information may
be useful, such as email address (for accounts opened via an Internet product delivery
channel).

Upon obtaining this information, the financial institution should, to the extent
practicable and as warranted by the nature of the account, verify the accuracy of the
information provided by the customer. Such verification processes can include one or
more of the following:

1. Visibly compare a photograph contained on an unexpired government-issued
identification (drivers license, passport, military identification, or other
government identification with a photograph of the customer) with the customer
to confirm that the photograph is that of the customer.

2. Obtain a U.S. government-issued identification to confirm the address, date of
birth, or other information provided by the customer.

3. Obtain other identification from the customer which, while not government-
issued, can be used to confirm the identification provided by the customer (such
as a utility bill with customer address, expired government identification with
picture, senior citizen identification, Amish or other special group identification).

4. Utilize information verification processes that either specifically verifies the
information provided by the customer (such as a credit report) or generally
confirm the legitimacy of the information provided by the customer (such as an
anti-fraud review which has general variables used to evaluate customer
information).

5. Contact the customer following the opening of the account, either by mail,
telephone, electronic communication or personal visit, to confirm the customer
information.

6. Other processes applicable to internet banking include customer authentication for
new accounts.¹

¹ ABA’s December 2001 “Summary of Internet Banking Survey” found that the majority of banks
authenticate the identity of a new customer applicant after the online application session is terminated.
Three authenticate some aspects online and other aspects after the fact. Nearly all banks authenticate by
comparing information to both existing bank data and consumer report data. A number of the banks verify
There are also situations where a financial institution obtains reliable, specific customer information about a customer as an integral component of the services requested, such as a fiduciary or similar account. These cases require the financial institution to document more detailed information about the customer than might be provided in traditional account opening processes for other products, allowing the institution to replace these processes with this detailed information. For example, when establishing a complex estate planning trust for a customer that requires the confirmation of a customer's source of wealth, residence and family members, it may be unnecessary for the institution to obtain a government issued identification for the creators and beneficiaries of the trust.

The financial institution should maintain a record of the processes used to verify the identification information provided by the customer. Should the information verification process reflect any discrepancies between what the customer provided and what the process disclosed, the financial institution should document what steps were taken to resolve the discrepancy.

Business Accounts

The collection of various types of identifying information and documentation and the processes for verification, as suggested below, may not be applicable to every type of customer or account. Financial institutions may conclude that based on their risk assessment of the customer and the type of services being provided that some customers (e.g., those who in the institution’s view are engaged in businesses associated with money laundering) may require more extensive verification than others.

For new accounts at a financial institution opened by a business (partnership, corporation, business trust or other entity other than a sole proprietor), the institution should, at a minimum, obtain and record the following information:

1. The name of the business
2. Tax Identification Number of the business
3. Principal place of business operations
4. Mailing address of business (if different than (3))
5. Phone number of business

phone numbers, require a copy of a drivers’ license or other identification, or use a third party vendor to verify information. The identities of existing customers’ opening an account on the internet are most often authenticated by comparing application information to existing bank data. Some banks, in addition, compare the information to consumer report data. Only two use a debit card personal identification number.
6. Type of business organization (corporation, partnership, trust, other)

7. Ownership information of the business (is the business publicly held, number and/or identity of owner of privately-owned business, type of tax-exempt entity, or other information regarding the business’s ownership)

8. If applicable, the website or email address of the business

Depending upon the type of account or other factors, it may be desirable for the financial institution to obtain additional information about the business, including the following:

1. Whether the business is a holding company for assets owned by affiliated organizations.

2. The primary type of activity engaged in by the business and whether its operations are primarily domestic or international.

3. For certain privately owned businesses, the information which is obtained for individual account holders.

Upon obtaining this information about the business, the financial institution should, to the extent practicable and as warranted by the nature of the account, verify the information provided by the business. Such verification can utilize one or more of the following:

1. Obtain a copy of the document confirming the existence of the business (e.g. certificate or articles of incorporation).

2. Obtain a financial statement (which may be certified) regarding the business.

3. Conduct a site visit of the place of business.

4. Utilize an independent information verification process (e.g. Dun and Bradstreet, or a credit reporting agency) to confirm the existence of the business.

5. Visit the business website or send a confirming electronic message to the business email address.

6. For privately owned businesses, perform one or more of the information verification processes regarding the information provided on behalf of the business owners.

Not every process may be applicable to every customer or account, and financial institutions may conclude that certain types of customers (for example, those who in
the institution’s view are engaged in businesses associated with money laundering) may require more extensive verification than others.

The financial institution should maintain a record of the processes used to verify the identification information provided by the customer. Should the information verification process disclose any discrepancies between what the customer provided and what the verification process disclosed, the financial institution should document what steps were taken to resolve the discrepancy.

**Known or Suspected Terrorists**

In addition to the processes described above, it is imperative that financial institutions determine at account opening whether the potential customer is identified on any list of known or suspected terrorist suspects or organizations that may have been provided to the institution by law enforcement or other government agencies. Financial institutions must follow appropriate reporting processes as required by governing regulatory agencies if a match is identified. Financial institutions may employ automated or manual procedures for this purpose, depending upon the size of the institution and other relevant factors.

**All Accounts**

Financial institutions may also consider evaluating whether potential customers are on any internal list of persons who may have had previous relationships closed by the institution or an affiliate.
The identification and verification process is designed for all new customers and existing customers seeking new products or relationships (the latter will provide a process to update old information and keep customer information current). All principals of business entities must meet the same identification and verification requirements as individual customers.

Appendix 1

Suggested Account Opening Identification and Verification Process Flow

Key

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification Documentation</th>
<th>Positive Decision or Result</th>
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<td>Negative Decision or Result</td>
<td>External to Subjective Decision</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unable to Verify</td>
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Uses of Information

Searchable Database of Account Opening Information and Verification

Personal Account: Personal Account Opened if Identification of Principals is verified

External to Subjective Decision

Records of Funds and Other Issues will be Subject to the Internal and External Audit Process

Institution's Internal Policy and Procedures for Control List Searches

Name, address, telephone number(s) should be set out in an accepted, standardized format; e.g., address identifiers U.S. Postal Service abbreviations with Zip Code.

This would allow for easier "Control List" searches as well as matching Zip Code with telephone area codes, for example.

The identification and verification process is designed for all new customers and existing customers seeking new products or relationships (the latter will provide a process to update old information and keep customer information current). All principals of business entities must meet the same identification and verification requirements as individual customers.
Appendix II
Additional Resources*


ABA Internet Fraud Survey, December 2001.

ABA Summary of Internet Banking Survey by the ABA Deposit Account Fraud Committee, December 2001.


Behind the Corporate Veil, Using Corporate Entities for Illicit Purposes, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2001

Websites for Performing Online Due Diligence Reviews on Persons/Entities

http://www.pac-info.com/ - state-by-state and global databases for corporations, business licenses, etc
http://www.freeality.com/ - Meta search engine
http://www.anybirthday.com/ - Birthdays
http://www.ffiec.gov/NIC/ - National Information Center's Bank Searches
http://www.searchbug.com/ - Search for people, addresses, telephone numbers, SSNs, Zip Codes, etc.
http://www.carol.co.uk/index.html - Annual reports
http://www.corporateinformation.com/ - Corporate Information
http://www.searchenginecolossus.com/ - Country-specific search engines
http://www.invisibleweb.com/ - Searchable databases on virtually everything
http://www.treas.gov/ofac/ - OFAC's web page with access to SDN lists
http://www.findlaw.com/directories/reverse.html - Reverse telephone directory
http://www.findlaw.com/directories/phone.html - Telephone directories
http://uscode.house.gov/usc.htm - U.S. Code sections
http://www.ipl.org/ref/websearching.html - Internet Public Library listing of web search engines
http://www.guidestar.org/search/ - Guidestar's American charitable organizations
http://www.ssa.gov/search/index.htm - Use the search term "highest group issued" to get latest SSN numbers
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm - SEC's Edgar database for company filings

* The sites listed in this have been provided as examples of verification tools that are available and are not recommended or endorsed by the American Bankers Association. Given the dynamic nature of Internet links, some of the links may have been amended since this guide was published and therefore may no longer be active.
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# Appendix IV

## Account Opening Best Practices Meeting

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November 19, 2001

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